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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
ST.l\TE OF UTAH

STl\TE OF UTA!!,

Plaintiff-Respondent,·

i

--vs-

Case No.
15509

Gl\RY WILLil'..C1 DANIELS,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

S'I'ATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged with the crime of theft,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6404 (1953 as amended).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty by a jury of the
crime charged on October 6, 1977, in the Third District Court,
tl;cc Honorable L!ay E. Banks presiding.

The appellant wa.s

sentenced to an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison
not to exceed 15 years, as provided by law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an affirmc.rnce of the verdict
of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts in this case are not disputed.

Sometii'''

during the evening of June 14, 1977, the appellant and a en-',

. I

panion took a 1968 Corvette from the sales lot of Midvalley:j
in Sandy, Utah (T.48,7).
The appellant stated that he was in Salt Lal:e Cic.
to visit relatives, and that his residence was in Alameda,
California (T. 46).

During his stay in Salt Lake the vehicle I

I
had used to drive from California to Salt Lake was impoundec'
(T.46) and he was unsuccessful in securing its release

(T.~;'

The appellant was unable to borrow money from members of hi:
family, and testified that he took the car to get to his hor 0 !
in California (T.47).
The appellant and his companion set out for Califc:·t
in the evening of June 14 and were stopped by a California
Highway Patrolman outside of Turckee, California the next
morning, after a chase in which the cars drove at speeds weli
over 100 miles per hour and the engine in the Corvette hl~
out

(T. 28-29).

The owner of the lot from which the car Has

taken testified that at the time he got the car back, about
30 days later, approximately $1750 worth of damage had ~~

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

inrll rred

(T. 8) .

Prior to the car's removal, it had been

rebuilt ('l'.6) ·
The appellant was booked for reckless driving and
transported to the Nevada County Sheriff's Office

(T.31).

At

that time he represented that he had purchased the car for
$',875 some four or five months earlier

(T.33).

Also, at this

time the car had a Utah 1 icense plate on the rear

(T. 3 8) •

The appellant made no attempt to alter the vehicle
identification numbers on the car

(T.35), and at trial, testi-

fied that at the time he took the car he only had $15.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE DEFENDANT ABOUT FACTS
SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL
COURT.

The appellant admitted at trial that he did steal the
automobile from the sales lot (T. 4 7) , and his sole defense was
that he did not intend to permanently deprive the owner of its
use or value.

Whether or not the appellant intended to return

the car can only be determined from the facts surrounding the
case.

I t would be absurd to expect the appellant to admit that

he intended to permanently deprive the owner of the car when
his intentions are dispositive of his guilt.

tvebber v. State,
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376 P.2d 348 (Ok.Cr. 1962).
The cross-examination complained of by the appe)'.
is as follows:
"Q
It only cost you $15.00 to get gas
to go frora here to Truckee, California?

A

No.

Q
Where did you get the rest of your
money for gas?

A
My friend had a couple dollars,
and, then, there's other ways.
Q

Would you like to elucidate?
MR. HILL:

I'm going to object.

TEE COURT: Overruled.
I
Q
(BY MS. MARLOWE)
Tell me how you
got gas between here and California.
A

What you call a garden hose.

Q

Whnt

~o

ycu mean by garden hose?

A
Well, it's a piece of garden hose
about six feet long.
You insert into a gas
tank, which is commonly known as siphoning.
Q
You siphoned gas or you stole gas
to get to California?

A
Yes, because I used all my rnoney up
before I even did that." (T.51, lines 9-27)
The law in Utah is quite clear on the issue of
admission of other bad acts:

evidence of prior bad acts or

he accusei I
crimes is not admissible if it merely disgraces t
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or shows a propensity to commit crime.
"Ho1·rever, where evidence has special
r2levancy to prove the crime of which the
defendant stands charged, it may be allowed
for that purpose; and the fact that it
shows another crime will not render the
evidence inadmissible."
state v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 at 415

(1961);

state v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969).
Evidence is also admissible if it tends to prove
that the defendant had the intent necessary to commit the crime.
State v. Torgerson, 4 Utah 2d 52, 286 P.2d 800,

(1955).

Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence makes specific
reference to the admissibility of evidence when relevant to
prove intent:
.subject to Rules 45 and 48,
such evidence is admissible when relevant
to prove some other material fact including absence of mistake or accident, motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, or identity."
The evidence would tend to discredit his claim that he did not
intend to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle.
v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972).

State

The limitations

on Rule 55 do not affect admissibility in this court.
Wigmore states that "we are further reenforced by
the fundamental canon that admissibility for one purpose is not
affected by inadmissibility for another."

§

218, Wigmore,

Third Edi ti on.

-5-
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The appellant has failed in his brief to disti'

nqu~.

the inadmissibility of prior bad acts from the admissibilit:
1

of evidence of acts concurrent with tlle crime charcred·.
:J

1

Ihe

testimony complained of is an inadve:::-tent admission of a
I

crime committed during the course of the theft of the automoti
The problem presented by the testimony is one of balancing

t·~

probative value of the evidence against the danger of pre-

l

judice to the defendant.
P. 2d 239

(1975).

i

State v. Manrigue, 271 Or. 201, 5Jl

The sole issue in the case at bar was the

::::::i:: ::et:::e:::::: and the testimony complained •n

I

of

1

There are numerous cases that discuss the admissit::I
of "concomitant parts of the criminal act."
§

218

(Third Edition) .

Wigmore on Evic

Many cases deal with instances

j

0

~

which the defendant has been charged with one violent crimn')
he has in fact committed several at the same time.
Gibson, 565 P. 2d 783
534 P. 2d 1107

~

(Utah 1977); State v. Izatt, 96 Ida 661,

(Idaho 1975).

These cases refer to the need

I

present the entire picture of the crime to the jury in allo•.i:·\
evidence of other concurrent crimes.

However, the "complete

picture" theory is not limited to violent crimes.
Baran, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P.2d 728

I

I
In ~!

(1970), the appellantwer.:(

.
on a spree that included
a robbery of a gas sta t'io n , a robbe'.I
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of a service station and another establishment, the theft
of a car, and a conspiracy to rob a theatre and cafe.

The

defendant was convicted for his role in the robbery of the gas
station, and on appeal alleged prejudicial error after the
trial court permitted his accomplice to testify as to the other
crimes committed on the same night as the crime for which he
was charged.

The court took note of State v. Lopez, supra,

and rejected his appeal.
Tillman v. State, 820 O.Cr. 276, 169 P.2d 223
involved a theft of an auto by three boys.

(1946)

The issue in Tillman

was the same issue as is before the court in the instant case:
the intent of the appellant to either retain or return the car.
In the Tillman case the prosecution was allowed to introduce
evidence that indicated the defendant, after stealing the car,
broke into a cafe and then obtained gas without paying for i t
during the time he still had the stolen car.

The court admitted

the evidence of the other crimes as part of the

res gestae of

the crime charged, and at 169 P.2d 227 said:
"It certainly became competent for
the state to trace all the actions of
the accused and his associates during
their asportation of the stolen property
for the purpose of showing whether their
actions were such as to indicate a purpose to permanently deprive the owner of
his property."
The testimony complained of in the present appeal
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was not an attack on the credibility or truthfulness of th,
defenr1ant.

Nor was it designed to shc.M th;:it the

had a prior history of bad acts.

defenda~t

At trial, the appellant's

attorney made an effort to show that the appellant was no'.
bent on crime, and that he was merely trying to get home i·
the only way he could.

However, his com..-nission of other c•:·;

in the course of his efforts to get home is probative ofG
general intent, which was the only contested issue at tr ii'.
There was a legitimate purpose to be served by the evidence,
and the fact that it may also show the comnission of anoU•·r
crime will not render it inadmissible.
P.2d 795

State v. Mason, SJP I

I

(Utah 1975).
The admissibility of evidence of other crimes,

including the balancing of its probative value against the da:l
I

of prejudice, is a matter to be left to the discretion~f
trial court in each case, subject to reversal only where
"clearly wrong."

State v. Gibson, supra.

I
natG'.o i

In looking at bi

I,

total circumstances of the case, and at the abstract

of the intent issue which was determinative of the case, tre I
I

trial judge acted properly in permitting the cross-examina,:j
to proceed over appellant's objection.

I

The testimony • 35

probative and relevant.
The appellant, in his brief

(p.7) refers~ t~

judge's improper assumption that items had been
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stolen

ud
I

vehicle, and his failure to instruct the jury to disregard the
testir,;0n~·

compL:iinecl of

(T. 54) .

The judge's comments regarding

the s tcreo ec1uiur:icnt were ma.de out of the presence of the jury,
and there was no need to instruct them to disregard those
conmen ts.

In view of the fact that the testimony concerning

the siphoning was properly admitted there was no need to instruct
the jury to disregard that testimony.
POINT II
THERE WAS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO
CONVINCE A RE!\SONF.BLE JUROR THAT THE APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF
THE

CRil1E FOR l'/HICH HE WAS COi'NICTED.
The appellant claims that the State has failed to

meet its burden of proving that he had the requisite intent
for the crime of theft.

In addition, the appellant states

that in light of State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d 360 (Utah 1977) and
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216

(Utah, 1976), the State must

prove
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had a conscious objective to
deprive the owner of the vehicle permanently or for such an extended period
of time that a substantial portion of
the economic'value is lost." (Appellant's
brief, pp. 10-11).
During the course of the trial, the appellant moved to dismiss
the action based on this same contention (T.39).

-9-

The trial
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judge noted that the appellant had attached a Utah lic 9

H

plate to the car and driven it across two state lines b

i

eforc I

he was apprehended (T. 4 0) , and concluded that these facts
supported a prima facia case against the appellant.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404

!

(1953 as amended) state, i

"A person commits theft if he obtains
or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose
to deprive him thereof."
Section 76-6-401 defines the terms used in § 76+ !
404 in the following manner:
"(1)

'Property' is anything of value . .

(3)
'Purpose to de!_Jrive' means to have
the conscious object: (a) to withhold property permanently or for so extended a peri~
or to use under such circumstances that a
substantial portion of its economic value,
or of the use and benefit thereof, would be
lost; or (b) . . . (c) . .
(4)
'Obtain or exercise unauthorized
control' means, but is not necessarily
limited to, conduct heretofore defined or
known as common-law larceny by trespassory
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by
bailee, and embezzlement."

I

The appellant does not contend that the State has :1
met its burden of proof in regards to § 76-6-401 (1) and l41·
There remains then only the need to show that appellant acte;
with an intent to permanently deprive.

The prosecution had no way to prove
er he arrivi:r·.
what the appellant's actions would have been aft
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i

at his inten0ed destination of Alameda, California.
it is true that the prosecution
(Cornish,~),

While

carries the burden of proof

the Romero court stated at 554 P.2d 218 that

"[T]he intent to steal or unlawfully
deprive the rightful owners of their property can be inferred by defendant's
conduct and the attendant circumstances
testified to by the witness."
~is

was essentially the position of the Illinois Supreme Court

in People v. Norris, 362 Ill. 492, 200 N.E. 330

(1936), where

they held that possession coupled with evidence of flight is
sufficient to sustain a verdict of auto theft.
evidence is sufficient to prove intent.

Circumstantial

State v. Joseph, 510

P.2d 69 (Ariz. App. 1973); State v. Romero, supra.
court in State v. Jackson, 101 Ar. 399, 420 P.2d 270
dealt

The Arizona
(1966),

1oith the issue confronted here and stated that:
"In considering the evidence of
appellant's criminal intent, we adhere
to the view that the wrongful taking
of another's property, without his
consent and with no apparent purpose of
returning it, in the absence of explanatory circumstances, evidences an intent
to deprive the owner permanently of his
property." (Court's emphasis)
I

If ther-= is a quest inn 'I~ to wh.<>thP-r nr n_0t -f:h_e prosecution has
\

met its burden of proof, "The matter of circumstances of the
intent to deprive should be submitted to the trier of fact."

~, supra, at 362.

-11-
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The prosecution must make out a prima facia case
to sustain its burden of proof, Romero, supra, which it di(
in this case.

The intent of the appellant can only

be~~
I

strued from his conduct during the event itself.

Thejury;f

free to disregard the appellant's statement that he intende;
to park the vehicle in front of the police station in Alarr,;,'
'-' -1
and they apparently did so.

The jury also heard the testimon (
I

to the effect that the defendant represented to the Califorr

1

I

Highway Patrol that he had purchased the car several months
prior to his apprehension

(T.33), and that the

defenda~

I
attempted to outrun the patrolman at the time he was arreste. j
(T.28).

I

This evidence is supportive of the jury verdict.
It is important to note that the trial court gave

proper instructions for both the theft and joy-riding
offenses

(R. 23-28), wh±ch included the statement that the
'

burden of proof is on the prosecution

(R.22,26,27).

The

std

for determining the insufficiency of evidence is set forth i:
Romero, supra, as follows:

I

"it [must] be so inconclusive or so
inharently improbable that reasonable
minds could not reasonably believe
defendant had committed a crime."
See also State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272,

(Uta h 19 -s)
I

I
I

I

!

; -stat~·!

Logan, 563 P. 2d 811,

(Utah 1977) and State v. Harless, 23

2d 128, 459 P.2d 210

(1969).

w:I

i
-12-
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l

It is not the Supreme Court's prerogative to weigh
evidence.

That function is reserved for the finder of fact.

state v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).

This court needs

only to decide whether or not the prosecution made out a prima
facia case at trial.
CONCLUSION
The trial judge acted properly when he allowed the
defendant to testify to the effect that he siphoned gas from
other vehicles during the course of his trip.
was probative of the appellant's intent.

The testimony

In addition, there

was adequate evidence to support the jury verdict.

Romero,

supra.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
MICHAEL L. DEAMER
Deputy Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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